



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG

THE battle of Chancellorsville was fought in the first four days of May, 1863. Hooker, who commanded the Army of the Potomac, met with a terrible defeat at the hands of General Lee, who then gave his army a rest of some weeks. He employed the time in its reorganization, dividing it into three corps, each of three divisions, commanded respectively by Longstreet, Ewell and A. P. Hill. Believing that nothing was to be gained by his army "remaining quietly on the defensive," he decided, with the approval of Davis, on the invasion of Pennsylvania. This movement would at all events, by threatening Washington and drawing Hooker in pursuit of him, relieve Virginia of the presence of a hostile army. But after such victories as Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville he would have been modest past belief had not his expectations gone far beyond so easy an achievement. He hoped to fight the Army of the Potomac on favorable conditions. With his own well-disciplined troops in high spirits and full of confidence in their leader, he could not have entertained an idea that the result would be other than a Confederate victory; perhaps even he might destroy the Union army, when Washington would be at his mercy and he could conquer a peace on Northern soil. Nothing at this time so disturbed the Southern high councils as the operations of Grant against Vicksburg. More than one project was proposed to save it from capture, but no diversion in its favor could be so effectual as the taking of the federal capital. If ever an aggressive movement with so high an object were to be made, now was the time. Not only was it to take advantage of the flush of Confederate success, but the South by delay would lose its efficiency for the offensive. "Our resources in men are constantly diminishing," wrote Lee to Davis, "and the disproportion in this respect between us and our enemies, if they continue united in their efforts to subjugate us, is steadily augmenting." To Lee's ability and decision of character were joined uncommon industry and attention to detail. He was a constant and careful reader of the Northern newspapers, and from the mass of news comment and speculation he drew many correct inferences, and hardly lost sight of any of the conditions which should be taken into account by him who would play well the game of

war. He meditated on the weariness of the contest so largely felt at the North and the growing strength of the Democrats, due in the main to Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. "We should neglect no honorable means of dividing and weakening our enemies," he wrote to Davis. We should "give all the encouragement we can, consistently with the truth, to the rising peace party of the North. Nor do I think we should, in this connection, make nice distinctions between those who declare for peace unconditionally and those who advocate it as a means of restoring the Union, however much we may prefer the former."

June 3 Lee began to move his army from the vicinity of Fredericksburg, and one week later put Ewell's corps in motion for the Shenandoah valley. Ewell drove the Union troops from Winchester and Martinsburg, and on the 15th part of his corps crossed the Potomac, the rest of it soon following. Hill and Longstreet moved forward, and by June 26 their corps had passed over the river and were in Maryland.

Hooker early suspected Lee's project of invasion, and when the movement commenced thought that he ought to attack the rear of the enemy; this operation he suggested to the President. "I have but one idea which I think worth suggesting to you," Lincoln replied, "and that is, in case you find Lee coming to the north of the Rappahannock I would by no means cross to the south of it. If he should leave a rear force at Fredericksburg, tempting you to fall upon it, it would fight in intrenchments and have you at disadvantage, and so, man for man, worst you at that point, while his main force would in some way be getting an advantage of you northward. In one word, I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river like an ox jumped half over a fence, and liable to be torn by dogs in front and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or kick the other." When Lee's plan of operations was further disclosed, Hooker proposed to march "to Richmond at once." He felt sure that he could take it, thus "giving the rebellion a mortal blow." Lincoln's reply was prompt. "If left to me," he said, "I would not go south of the Rappahannock upon Lee's moving north of it. If you had Richmond invested to-day, you would not be able to take it in twenty days; meanwhile your communications and with them your army would be ruined. I think Lee's army and not Richmond is your sure objective point. If he comes toward the upper Potomac, follow on his flank and on his inside track, shortening your line while he lengthens his. Fight him, too, when opportunity offers. If he stays where he is, fret him and fret him."

In these despatches Lincoln exhibits common-sense. His diligent reading of military books, the acquirement of knowledge from his generals when occasion offered, the study of the field of war, the close observation of the campaigns and battles of his armies had borne fruit, making him now the best of counsellors in the relation of the civil commander-in-chief to his officers of technical training and experience. Especially at this time was such counsel necessary from a chief who possessed tact and knowledge of men. The relations between Halleck and Hooker were strained. There was a lack of the harmonious co-operation requisite between those holding so responsible positions. "Almost every request I made of General Halleck was refused," testified Hooker, while Halleck complained that Hooker reported directly to the President. The correspondence between the two generals is marked with acerbity. Moreover, some of the corps and division commanders of the Army of the Potomac had lost confidence in their general. This strained situation while the Army of Northern Virginia under its able leader was advancing into the heart of the North might well have dismayed many a stout soul. Lincoln met the crisis without faltering.

When Lee's northward movement seemed certain, Hooker broke up his camps on the Rappahannock. In his march to the Potomac his management and dispositions were excellent. The Confederates kept to the west of the Blue Ridge, he to the east, covering Washington constantly. Ewell waited at Hagerstown, Maryland, until Longstreet and Hill should be within supporting distance. June 22 he received orders allowing him to move forward. "If Harrisburg comes within your means, capture it," was one of the directions which came from Lee. Ewell, advancing into Pennsylvania to Chambersburg, reached Carlisle on the 27th, and sent Early with one division to seize upon York. On the formal surrender of the town by the chief burgess and a deputation of citizens, Early laid it under contribution, receiving 1000 hats, 1200 pairs of shoes, 1000 socks, three days' rations of all kinds, and \$28,600 United States money. He destroyed between Hanover Junction and York the Northern Central Railroad, which ran from Baltimore to Harrisburg, and sent an expedition to take possession of the Columbia bridge over the Susquehanna. He intended to march his division across it, cut the line of the Pennsylvania Railroad, take Lancaster, make a requisition upon the town for supplies, and attack Harrisburg in the rear while the rest of Ewell's corps assailed it from the front. But a regiment of Pennsylvania militia in fleeing before the Confederates set fire to the bridge and destroyed it. Meanwhile Ewell sent forward his cavalry with a section of

artillery to make a reconnaissance. They approached within three miles of Harrisburg, engaging the pickets of the militia forces assembled there under General Couch for its defence. June 29 Ewell had everything in readiness, and purposed moving on the defences of Harrisburg. Two days previously Longstreet and Hill had reached Chambersburg, and Lee was there in command. His whole army, numbering 75,000 men, was on Pennsylvania soil.

By the middle of June the movements of Lee in Virginia warned the North of the approaching invasion. June 16 the Confederate cavalry were heard of at Chambersburg, and busy preparations were made to defend the threatened points. At one time there was some anxiety for Washington and Baltimore. Stuart in a cavalry raid passed between the Union army and these cities. It was in the Cumberland valley of Pennsylvania, however, that the presence of the enemy was actually and painfully felt. At first the raid of the Confederate horsemen caused excitement. The feeling of relief when they fell back was only temporary, and gave place to alarm and distress as Ewell's corps advanced, and later the rest of Lee's army. The country was wild with rumors. Men, women and children fled before the enemy, and care was taken to run their horses out of the way of the invader. The refugees deemed themselves and their property safe when they had crossed the broad Susquehanna. The bridge over the river, the communication of the Cumberland valley with Harrisburg, was thronged with wagons laden with household goods and furniture. Negroes fled before the advancing host, fearing that they might be dragged back to slavery. June 26 Curtin, the governor of Pennsylvania, issued a proclamation calling for 60,000 men to come forward promptly "to defend their soil, their families, and their firesides." Harrisburg, the capital of the state, was indeed in danger, as was realized by the authorities and the citizens. Thirty regiments of Pennsylvania militia, besides artillery and cavalry, and nineteen regiments from New York assembled under the command of General Couch, who disposed his forces to the best advantage, stationing a large portion of them for the defence of Harrisburg. In the city all places of business were closed, and citizens labored on the fortifications with the pick and the spade. Men were enrolled by wards and drilled in the park and on the streets. The railroad depot was a scene of excitement, caused by the arrival of volunteers in large numbers, and the departure of women and frightened men. The progress of the enemy was pretty accurately known. Reports ran that he was twenty-three miles from the city, then eighteen. June 28 cannon-ading was heard for two hours, and everyone knew that the Con-

federates were within four miles of the Capitol. Harrisburg would probably have been taken had not Ewell's corps been called back by Lee.

If Harrisburg were captured it was thought that the Confederates would march on Philadelphia. Men well informed believed that Lee had nearly 100,000 men and 250 pieces of artillery. On the evening of June 28 the rumor circulated in Philadelphia that the Confederates were shelling Harrisburg. Chestnut and Market streets were thronged with thousands of men eager for the news. The next day two prominent citizens telegraphed the President that they had reliable information that the enemy in large force was marching upon Philadelphia. Other men of influence desired him to give the general in command authority to declare martial law. Business stopped. The merchants, the manufacturers of iron, the proprietors of machine-shops the coal operators held meetings and offered inducements to their workmen to enlist for the defence of the state. The members of the Corn Exchange furnished five companies. A meeting of the soldiers of the War of 1812 and another of clergymen were held to offer their services for home defence. It was said that bankers and merchants were making preparations to remove specie and other valuables from the city. Receipts and shipments on the Pennsylvania Railroad were suspended. With all the disturbance and alarm there was no panic. The excitement was at its height from June 27 to July 1. July 1 the sale of government five-twenties for the day amounted to \$1,700,000. Few trains were running on the eastern division of the Pennsylvania Railroad, and it was expected that the track would in many places be destroyed, yet the shares of this company sold in Philadelphia at 61¾ June 27, and at 60 July 1, on a par basis of 50—a fact as worthy of report as the story of Livy that the ground on which Hannibal encamped his army three miles from Rome, happening at that very time to be sold, brought a price none the lower on account of its possession by the invaders. While gold advanced in New York, there was no panic in the stock market.

When the alarm at the invasion of Pennsylvania was at its height, when every man in the North tremblingly took up his morning newspaper and with a sinking heart watched the daily bulletins, the intelligence came that there had been a change in commanders of the Army of the Potomac. Those in authority depended for the salvation of Harrisburg, Baltimore, and Washington on this army, which the public with its half-knowledge of the situation also felt to be their mainstay.

Hooker, following upon Lee's right flank and covering Washing-

ton, crossed the Potomac, and June 27 made his headquarters at Frederick, Maryland. He proposed to strike Lee's line of communications with Richmond, and desired the garrison of 10,000, holding Maryland Heights, which commanded Harper's Ferry, as a reinforcement to the corps which he had ordered to march west for that purpose. "Is there any reason why Maryland Heights should not be abandoned?" he asked Halleck. "I cannot approve their abandonment," was the answer, "except in case of absolute necessity." Hooker wrote a reply proving that the troops in question were "of no earthly account at Harper's Ferry," while, if placed at his disposition, they might be used with advantage. He ended his despatch with begging that it be presented to the President and the Secretary of War. Immediately after he had sent it, his growing anger at what he considered the unwise and shackling instructions of the general-in-chief prompted him to write, apparently in a fit of petulance, a second despatch asking to be relieved of his position. Halleck received the second telegram five minutes after the first, and referred it to the President. Lincoln made up his mind quickly, and sent an officer to the Army of the Potomac with an order relieving Hooker and appointing in his place George G. Meade. It was an excellent choice. Meade looked like a student, had scholarly habits, was an officer of courage and ability, and commanded now the Fifth Corps, having served in the Potomac army with credit, even distinction. Receiving the communication from the President late on the night of June 27 or early the next morning, he answered it at 7 A. M. in a tone of genuineness which betokened confidence. "As a soldier," he said, "I obey the order placing me in command of this army, and to the utmost of my ability will execute it." The appointment was satisfactory to the officers of the army. Although the risk was great in making a change of generals at so critical a moment, Fortune attended the step and smiled on the new commander during the next five days which gave him fame.

"You are intrusted," wrote Halleck to Meade, "with all the power which the President, the Secretary of War, or the General-in-Chief can confer upon you, and you may rely upon our full support." In answer to a specific inquiry, Meade received for a second time the permission to do as he pleased with the garrison on Maryland Heights. He withdrew it, and posted the larger part of the troops at Frederick as a reserve.

He estimated Lee's force at 80,000 to 100,000; his own he placed at the larger number. His resolution was prompt. June 29 and 30 he advanced northward, and by the evening of the

30th the First Corps had crossed the Pennsylvania line, while the Third and the Eleventh were in the northern part of Maryland; these three constituting the left wing of the army under the command of General Reynolds. The Twelfth Corps lay in Pennsylvania, but at some distance east of the First. Meade established his headquarters at Taneytown, Maryland, thirteen miles south of Gettysburg, retaining the Second and Fifth Corps within easy reach. The Sixth Corps was likewise in Maryland, but lay farther to the eastward, thirty-four miles from Gettysburg. Meade had been prompt to command, his subordinates zealous to obey. The officers, sinking for the moment all their rivalries and jealousies, were careful and untiring in their efforts, while the soldiers did wonders in making long and rapid marches in the hot sun and sultry air of the last days of June. The main idea of Meade had been "to find and fight the enemy," at the same time covering Baltimore and Washington. Hearing now that Lee was falling back and concentrating his army, he announced his present design in a despatch to Halleck. "The news proves that my advance has answered its purpose," he said. "I shall not advance any, but prepare to receive an attack in case Lee makes one. A battle-field is being selected to the rear on which the army can be rapidly concentrated."

The first mistake in Lee's campaign arose from the absence of Stuart's cavalry. He had no accurate and speedy knowledge of the movements of the Federals. His own and Longstreet's instructions to Stuart lacked precision, and Stuart made an unwise use of his discretion. Forgetting perhaps that the main use of horsemen in an enemy's country is to serve as the eyes of the army, the spirit of adventure led him into a raid about the Union troops which lost him all communication with the Confederate army, so that Lee was in the dark as to the progress of his adversary. On the night of June 28 a scout brought word to him that the Union army had crossed the Potomac and was advancing northward. His communications with Virginia were menaced, and he did not dare to let them be intercepted. He might indeed for a while live upon the country, but he could not in his position suffer the interruption of his supplies of ammunition. He called Ewell back from his projected attack upon Harrisburg, and ordered him as well as Longstreet and Hill to march to Gettysburg, on the east side of the South Mountain range.

July 1 Reynolds came in contact with the Confederates. Buford with his cavalry having the day before taken possession of Gettysburg and occupied Seminary Ridge west of the town was resisting their advance when Reynolds with the First Corps came to his

assistance. Sending orders to Howard to advance promptly with the Eleventh, Reynolds selected the battle-field and opened the battle of Gettysburg, but he did not live to see the result of his heroic stand. Before noon he received a bullet in his brain and died instantly. "The death of this splendid officer," writes Fitzhugh Lee with grace, "was regretted by friend and foe," and borrowing the words of another, he adds, "No man died on that field with more glory than he; yet many died, and there was much glory!"

After Reynold's death matters went badly for the First and Eleventh Corps. They were "overborne by superior numbers and forced back through Gettysburg with great slaughter." Buford's despatch of 3:20 P. M. points out an important reason for the defeat. "In my opinion," he said, "there seems to be no directing person." All was confusion and looked like disaster when Hancock arrived on the field. On hearing that Reynolds was killed, Meade, with his excellent judgment of the right man for the place, sent Hancock forward to take the command. He restored order and inspired confidence while the Union troops were placed in a strong position on Cemetery Hill, east of the town. It is thought that if the Confederates had been prompt they might have carried the height, but the order to do so from Lee to Ewell was conditional, and with his force then present he did not deem the attempt practicable. Nevertheless, the first day of the battle of Gettysburg was a Confederate success.

Late in the afternoon of July 1 Slocum with the Twelfth Corps had arrived at Gettysburg. Sickles with the Third Corps marched thither with celerity and zeal. The reports of Hancock, Howard, and others decided Meade that Gettysburg was a good place to fight his battle, and he issued orders to all of his corps to concentrate at that point. He himself arrived upon the battle-field at one in the morning, pale, tired looking, hollow-eyed, and worn out from want of sleep, anxiety, and the weight of responsibility.

By the afternoon of July 2, Lee and Meade had their whole forces on the field, the armies being about a mile apart. Lee had 70,000, Meade 93,500, less the losses of the first day, which had been much greater on the Union than on the Confederate side. The Confederates occupied Seminary Ridge in a line concave in form, the Federals Cemetery Ridge in a convex line, a position admirably adapted for defence. Meade decided to await attack, and if he had studied closely the character and history of his energetic adversary, he might have been almost certain that it would come. Longstreet, however, differed with his commander. In a conversation at the close of the first day's fight, he expressed a desire that

their troops be thrown around the left of the Union army, interposing themselves between it and Washington and forcing Meade to take the offensive. The anxiety of Lee at not receiving any information from his cavalry had become excitement, and, somewhat irritated at a suggestion contrary to what he had determined upon, he said, "No, the enemy is there and I am going to attack him." From the commencement of his invasion, he had shown contempt of his foe. The stretching of his line from Fredericksburg to Winchester in the face of an opponent who had greater numbers can bear no other construction. While he deemed Meade a better general than Hooker, he thought that the change of commanders at this critical moment counterbalanced the advantage in generalship; and while he was astonished at the rapid and efficient movements of the Army of the Potomac after Meade took command, he had undoubtedly become convinced from his almost unvarying success that he and his army were invincible—a confidence shared by nearly all of his officers and men. His victories on his own soil were extraordinary, but if we compare his campaigns of invasion with those of Napoleon we shall see how far he fell short when he undertook operations in an unfriendly country, although the troops that followed him were in fighting qualities unsurpassed. "Except in equipment," writes General Alexander, "I think a better army, better nerved up to its work, never marched upon a battle-field." With such soldiers, if Lee had been as great a general as Napoleon, Gettysburg had been an Austerlitz, Washington and the Union had fallen.

Lee was up betimes on the morning of July 2, but the movements of his soldiers were slow, and he lost much of the advantage of his more speedy concentration than Meade's. The afternoon was well advanced when he began his attack, and by that time the last of the Union army, the Sixth Corps, which had marched thirty-four miles in eighteen hours, was arriving. There was tremendous fighting and heavy loss that afternoon on both wings of each army. On the Union side Warren and Humphreys distinguished themselves. Sickles was struck by a cannon-ball that caused the loss of a leg, and was borne from the field. The result of the day is accurately told by Lee: "We attempted to dislodge the enemy, and, though we gained some ground, we were unable to get possession of his position." The Confederate assaults had been disjointed: to that mistake is ascribed their small success.

The feeling among the officers in Meade's camp that night was one of gloom. On the first day of the battle the First and Eleventh corps had been almost annihilated. On the second day the Fifth

and part of the Second had been shattered ; the Third, in the words of its commander who succeeded Sickles, was " used up and not in good condition to fight." The loss of the army had been 20,000 men. Only the Sixth and Twelfth corps were fresh. But the generals had not lost spirit, and in the council of war called by Meade all voted to " stay and fight it out." The rank and file had fought as Anglo-Saxons nearly always fight on their own soil. We may guess that on this gloomy night the men went over again in their minds the fate of their army when under Pope, Burnside and Hooker it had encountered the veterans of Lee, but in spite of this doleful retrospect they must have felt in some measure " the spirit that animated general headquarters," the energy of Meade and the faithful co-operation of his generals.

Meade had no thought of taking the offensive, and was busy in improving the natural defences of his position with earthworks. The partial successes of the Confederates determined Lee to continue the attack on the 3d of July. In the early morning there was fighting on the right of the Union line. Then followed an unnatural stillness. " The whole field became as silent as a churchyard until one o'clock." Suddenly came from the Confederate side the reports of two signal guns in quick succession. A bombardment from one hundred and fifteen cannon commenced, and was replied to by eighty guns of the Union army, whose convex line, advantageous in other respects, did not admit of their bringing into action a large part of their artillery. " It was a most terrific and appalling cannonade," said Hancock. But it did little damage. The Union soldiers lay under the protection of stone walls, swells of the ground, and earthworks, and the projectiles of the enemy passed over their heads, sweeping the open ground in their rear. Everybody from the commanding general to the privates felt that this was only preliminary to an infantry charge, and all braced themselves for the tug of war. Hancock with his staff, his corps flag flying, rode deliberately along the front of his line, and by his coolness and his magnificent presence inspired his men with courage and determination. For an hour and a half this raging cannonade was kept up, when Hunt, the chief of the Union artillery, finding his ammunition running low, gave the order to cease firing. The Confederates thought that they had silenced the Federal batteries, and made preparation for their next move.

Longstreet had no sympathy with the vigorously offensive tactics of his chief ; and when Lee on the morning of this July 3 directed him to be ready after the bombardment had done its work to make an attack with Pickett's fresh division reinforced from

Hill's corps up to 15,000 men, he demurred, arguing that the assault could not succeed. Lee showed a little impatience, apparently made no reply, and by silence insisted on the execution of his order. Longstreet took Pickett to the crest of Seminary Ridge, pointed out to him what was to be done, and left him with a heavy heart. Alexander of the artillery was directed to note carefully the effect of his fire, and when the favorable moment came to give Pickett the order to charge. He did not like this responsibility, and asked Longstreet for specific instructions, but the reply which came lacked precision. Still the artillery must open, and when the fire of the Federal guns had ceased, as has been related, Alexander, looking anxiously through his glass at the points whence it had proceeded, and observing no sign of life in the five minutes that followed, sent word to Pickett: "For God's sake, come quick . . . Come quick, or my ammunition won't let me support you properly." Pickett went to Longstreet. "General, shall I advance?" he asked. Longstreet could not speak, but bowed in answer. "Sir," said Pickett, with a determined voice, "I shall lead my division forward." Alexander had ceased firing. Longstreet rode to where he stood, and exclaimed: "I don't want to make this attack. I would stop it now but that General Lee ordered it and expects it to go on. I don't see how it can succeed." But as he spoke Pickett at the head of his troops rode over the crest of Seminary Ridge and began his descent down the slope. "As he passed me," writes Longstreet, "he rode gracefully, with his jaunty cap raked well over on his right ear, and his long auburn locks, nicely dressed, hanging almost to his shoulders. He seemed a holiday soldier." From the other side the Union soldiers watched the advance of Pickett and his fifteen thousand with suspense, with admiration. As they came forward steadily and in perfect order with banners flying, those who looked on might for the moment have thought it a Fourth of July parade.

The Confederates had nearly a mile to go across the valley. As they descended the slope on that clear afternoon under the July sun in full view of their foe, they received a dreadful fire from the Union batteries, which had been put in entire readiness to check such an onset. Steadily and coolly they advanced. After they had got away the Confederate artillery reopened over their heads, in the effort to draw the deadly fire directed at them from Cemetery Ridge; but the Union guns made no change in aim, and went on mowing down Pickett's men. Half-way across there was the shelter of a ravine. They stopped for a moment to breathe, then advanced again, still in good order. A storm of canister came. The slaughter

was terrible. The left staggered ; but, nothing daunted, Pickett and what was left of his own division of forty-nine hundred pressed on in the lead. The other divisions followed. Now the Union infantry opened fire. Pickett halted at musket range and discharged a volley, then rushed on up the slope. Near the Federal lines he made a pause "to close ranks and mass for a final plunge." In the last assault Armistead, a brigade commander, pressed forward, leaped the stone wall, waved his sword with his hat on it, shouted, "Give them the cold steel, boys !" and laid his hands upon a gun. A hundred of his men had followed. They planted the Confederate battle-flags on Cemetery Ridge among the cannon they had captured and for the moment held. Armistead was shot down ; Garnett and Kemper, Pickett's other brigadiers, fell. The wavering divisions of Hill's corps "seemed appalled, broke their ranks," and fell back. "The Federals swarmed around Pickett," writes Longstreet, "attacking on all sides, enveloped and broke up his command. They drove the fragments back upon our lines." Pickett gave the word to retreat.

The Confederates in their charge struck the front of the Second Corps. Hancock, its commander, "the best tactician of the Potomac army," showed the same reckless courage as Pickett, and seemed to be everywhere directing and encouraging his troops. Struck by a ball, he fell from his horse ; and lying on the ground, "his wound spouting blood," he raised himself on his elbow and gave the order, "Go in, Colonel, and give it to them on the flank." Not until the battle of Gettysburg was over did he resign himself to his surgeon, and shortly afterwards he dictated this despatch to Meade : "I have never seen a more formidable attack, and if the Sixth and Fifth corps have pressed up the enemy will be destroyed. . . . I did not leave the field until the victory was entirely secured and the enemy no longer in sight. I am badly wounded, though I trust not seriously. I had to break the line to attack the enemy in flank on my right, where the enemy was most persistent after the front attack was repelled. Not a rebel was in sight upright when I left."

Decry war as we may and ought, "breathes there the man with soul so dead" who would not thrill with emotion to claim for his countrymen the men who made that charge and the men who met it ?

Longstreet, calm and self-possessed, meriting the name "bulldog" applied to him by his soldiers, expected a counter attack and made ready for it. Lee, entirely alone, rode up to encourage and rally his broken troops. "His face did not show signs of the slightest disappointment, care, or annoyance," recorded Lieut.-Col. Fre-

mantle, an English officer, in his diary on the day of the battle, "and he was addressing to every soldier he met a few words of encouragement, such as, 'All this will come right in the end; we'll talk it over afterwards, but in the mean time all good men must rally. We want all good and true men just now.' He spoke to all the wounded men that passed him, and the slightly wounded he exhorted 'to bind up their hurts and take up a musket' in this emergency. Very few failed to answer his appeal, and I saw many badly wounded men take off their hats and cheer him. He said to me, 'This has been a sad day for us, Colonel—a sad day; but we can't expect always to gain victories.' . . .

"Notwithstanding the misfortune which had so suddenly befallen him, General Lee seemed to observe everything, however trivial. When a mounted officer began licking his horse for shying at the bursting of a shell, he called out, 'Don't whip him, Captain; don't whip him. I've got just such another foolish horse myself, and whipping does no good.'"

An officer almost angry came up to report the state of his brigade. "General Lee immediately shook hands with him and said cheerfully, 'Never mind, General, *all this has been my fault*—it is *I* that have lost this fight, and you must help me out of it in the best way you can.'"

On the morning of the Fourth of July the people of the North received this word: "The President announces to the country that news from the Army of the Potomac, up to 10 P. M. of the 3d, is such as to cover that army with the highest honor, to promise a great success to the cause of the Union, and to claim the condolence of all for the many gallant fallen, and that for this he especially desires that on this day He whose will, not ours, should ever be done be everywhere remembered and revered with profoundest gratitude." The rejoicing of the people was not boisterous; it took the character of supreme thankfulness for a great deliverance. The victory of Gettysburg demonstrated that Lee and his army were not invincible, and that the Confederates had lost in playing the card of an invasion of the North. Nothing now remained to them but a policy of stubborn defence. That this would likewise end in ruin was foreshadowed by the fateful event of the Fourth of July. Vicksburg surrendered to General Grant. Meade's sturdy and victorious resistance to attack was followed by the glorious end of the most brilliant offensive campaign of the war. Had the war been one between two nations, it would now have undoubtedly terminated in a treaty of peace, with conditions imposed largely by the more successful contestant.